Discussion memorandum: appraisal and valuation services, September 1999 by Independence Standards Board
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection 
1999 
Discussion memorandum: appraisal and valuation services, 
September 1999 
Independence Standards Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Independence Standards Board, "Discussion memorandum: appraisal and valuation services, September 
1999" (1999). Association Sections, Divisions, Boards, Teams. 399. 
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_assoc/399 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) Historical Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Association Sections, Divisions, 
Boards, Teams by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact 
egrove@olemiss.edu. 
DM 99-3
Discussion 
Memorandum
Appraisal and Valuation Services
September 1999
ISB
Independence 
Standards 
Board
Independence
Standards
Board
Discussion Memorandum
(DM 99-3)
Appraisal and Valuation Services
September 1999
Comments should be received by November 30, 1999, and addressed to:
Independence Standards Board, 6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: DM 99-3
Comments may also be faxed to (212) 596-6137, or sent via e-mail to 
isb@cpaindependence.org (the subject line should refer to DM 99-3).
ISB
Independence 
Standards 
Board
BOARD
William T. Allen. Chairman
Director
Center for Law and Business
New York University
John C. Bogle
Senior Chairman
The Vanguard Group, Inc.
Stephen G. Butler. CPA
Chairman and CEO
KPMG LLP
Date: September 1999
To: Interested Parties
From: William T. Allen, Chairman
The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB or 
Board) is to establish independence standards applicable to 
the audits of public entities in order to serve the public
Robert E. Denham
Partner
Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
Manuel H. Johnson
Co-Chairman and
Senior Partner
Johnson Smick
International
interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in 
the securities markets. While working concurrently on its 
project to establish a conceptual framework for auditor 
independence to serve as the foundation for principles-based 
independence standards, the Board is studying the 
independence concerns related to the provision of appraisal 
and valuation services to audit clients. As such, the Board 
seeks comment on the issues described in this discussion
Philip A. Laskawy. CPA
Chairman and CEO 
Ernst & Young LLP
memorandum.
Barry C. Melancon, CPA
President and CEO 
American Institute of CPAs
James J. Schiro, CPA
Chief Executive Officer 
PricewaterhouseCoopers
The operating policies of the ISB are designed to permit timely, 
thorough, and open study of issues involving auditor 
independence and to encourage broad public participation in 
the process of establishing and improving independence 
standards. All of the ISB’s constituencies, including members 
of the public, are encouraged to express their views on matters
STAFF
Arthur Siegel. CPA
Executive Director
under consideration in order to stimulate constructive public 
dialogue.
The ISB specifically seeks comments on the questions posed at
Richard H. Towers, CPA
Technical Director
the end of the discussion memo, and would welcome 
comments and suggestions on any other aspect of the
Susan McGrath. CPA
Director
appraisal and valuation issue.
William J. Cashin Jr.. CPA. CFA
Project Director
Christine D. Bricker
Assistant Technical Director
Responses should be addressed to the Independence 
Standards Board, 6th Floor, 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New 
York, New York 10036-8775, Attn: DM 99-3. Responses 
may also be faxed to (212) 596-6137, or sent via e-mail to 
isb@cpaindependence.org (the subject line should refer to DM 
99-3). Comments must be received by November 30, 1999.
All responses will be available for public inspection and
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775
(212) 596-6133 fax (212) 596-6137
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org
copying for one year at the offices of the Independence 
Standards Board and at the library of the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) at Harborside Financial 
Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, New Jersey.
ISB Discussion Memoranda explore auditor independence 
issues in an effort to solicit debate and public comment. They 
do not in any way modify existing auditor independence 
requirements.
Appraisal and Valuation Services
Discussion Memorandum
Contents
Paragraph 
Number
Executive Summary 1
Background 4
Current Rules 8
■ SEC Independence Rules and Regulations 9
■ AICPA Rules Applicable to All Auditors 13
■ SEC Practice Section Rules 15
■ Standards Governing Appraisers and
Valuation Experts 16
Threats to Independence
■ Self-review 18
■ Mutuality of Interests and Acting in
the Capacity of Management 21
Possible Criteria for Standard-Setting
• Materiality and Efficiency 25
• Level of Judgment Required 32
• Level of Comfort Requested from the
Appraisal / Valuation Specialist 35
• Disclosure of Assumptions in the Financial
Statements 37
■ Financial Statement Impact 39
Potential Safeguards
• Additional Reviews 42
• Discussion of Services Performed with
the Audit Committee 45
• Audit of a Subsidiary by Another Firm 46
• Firewalls 47
Questions for Respondents

Independence Standards Board 
Appraisals and Valuation Services
Executive Summary
1. This discussion memorandum is the first step in a process that will 
culminate in the issuance of formal independence guidance on appraisal and 
valuation services that audit firm professionals can or cannot provide public­
company audit clients. The project developed in recognition of the need for 
clear guidance delineating acceptable activities versus those that would impair 
the independence of the auditor, and out of a desire to bring some consistency 
to accepted practice.
2. The memorandum discusses:
a. the current rules governing provision of appraisal and valuation 
services by audit firm professionals to audit clients;
b. professional standards governing appraisal and valuation specialists;
c. threats to auditor independence that the provision of these services 
may pose;
d. possible criteria that the Board might use in setting standards 
governing these services; and
e. safeguards that some suggest may be effective in protecting 
independence when firm professionals perform these services for audit 
clients.
3. Readers are asked to respond to a variety of questions following the 
discussion. Readers are asked whether the discussion memorandum identifies 
all the threats to auditor independence that these services may pose, and to 
comment on several alternatives that the Board might use in developing 
standards. The discussion memorandum also asks whether there are other 
distinctions among offered services that the Board could use in standard­
setting. Finally, readers are asked whether safeguards could effectively protect 
auditor independence if audit firm professionals were allowed to provide some 
of these services to audit clients.
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Independence Standards Board 
Appraisals and Valuation Services
Background
4. The provision of certain appraisal and valuation services  by auditors to 
audit clients has received some attention from regulators and standard-setters 
over the past year. While some believe that providing these services could 
impair the auditor’s independence with respect to an audit client, certain 
exceptions to a complete prohibition have historically been allowed. Others 
believe that safeguards can adequately protect auditor independence when firm 
professionals perform appraisals and valuations for audit clients.
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5. Recently, the SEC Staff has expressed independence concerns regarding 
auditor valuations of “in-process research and development costs,” as part of an 
auditor-assisted allocation of the purchase price of an acquired business to its 
individual assets and liabilities. This allocation assistance has historically been 
permitted, but the significance of the in-process R&D valuations to the financial 
statements of some companies has caused the Staff to question whether 
auditors should perform them for audit clients.
6. This focus on these services also highlighted several inconsistencies or 
anomalies in the existing rules, which some believe may be outdated. In 
addition, the Board recently issued guidance on assisting audit clients in the 
implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments 
and Hedging Activities. That project made clear the need for general guidance 
as to the extent of assistance that auditors can provide audit clients in valuing 
assets (or liabilities) while preserving their independence. Accordingly, the 
Board is issuing this discussion memorandum to solicit comment on the 
independence issues related to auditor provision of appraisal and valuation 
services. The Board’s objective is to develop standards delineating the 
circumstances in which providing these services would impair auditor 
independence.
7. Audit firms may provide a wide-variety of appraisal and valuation services. 
These services may include:
1 The American Society of Appraisers, a professional organization representing all disciplines of appraisal 
practice, defines appraising as (1) the estimation of the cost of producing or replacing physical property; (2) 
the forecasting of the monetary earning power of certain classes of property; (3) the valuation or 
determination of the worth of property. The Society defines property to include the “legal rights of 
ownership of tangible or intangible entities.” The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Simon & Schuster, 1974) 
defines “appraise” as “to set a value on,” while defining “valuation” as “the act or process of valuing,” the 
“appraisal of property.” In this paper, the terms “appraisal” and “valuation” are used interchangeably, and 
are meant to include the process of valuing assets, both tangible and intangible, and liabilities.
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a. the allocation of the purchase price of an acquired business to its 
individual assets and liabilities;
b. valuation of in-process research and development costs;
c. valuation of derivatives;
d. valuation of stock options;
e. calculation of pension plan and other post-employment benefit 
liabilities;
f. valuations for estate and gift tax purposes;
g. valuation of environmental liabilities;
h. appraisal of real estate or collateral supporting loans; and
i. valuation of insurance reserves.
Current Rules
8. The independence rules on rendering appraisal and valuation services to 
audit clients distinguish between:
a. firm specialists assisting the audit team in auditing a client’s financial 
statements; and
b. separate engagements to appraise or value a client’s assets or 
liabilities.
There are no independence concerns when audit teams use firm specialists 
such as appraisers to assist in auditing the fair value of a company’s assets and 
liabilities. The concern arises when the audit firm appraiser’s work becomes 
the client’s primary support for recording amounts or the basis for business 
decisions (e.g., determining a buy or sell price for an asset).
SEC Independence Rules and Regulations2
2 “No action” letters issued by the SEC Staff: Touche Ross & Co., December 10, 1985, Kenneth Levanthol 
& Company, May 24, 1988, and Pannell Kerr Forster, July 11, 1988.
9. In general, the SEC Staff has independence guidance which limits the 
auditor’s ability to provide appraisal and valuation services to audit clients. 
Such limitations reflect concerns about auditor provision of these services 
which include:
3
a. the possibility that the auditor would not be objective in reviewing the 
value of an asset or liability calculated by a colleague or group within his 
or her firm (i.e., concerns related to “self-review”).
b. development of an inappropriate “mutuality of interest” between the 
auditor and the client. Appraisal and valuation methodology often involves 
the use of cash flow projections, or other forecasts of the company’s future 
results.  The concern is that the auditor could become committed to 
projections used in the appraisal that he or she may have developed or 
assisted the client in developing - projections also used in determining 
whether, for example, asset impairments have occurred, or the company 
will be able to satisfy its obligations to creditors.
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c. The decisions required in the valuation process have been 
characterized as “management responsibilities,” which conflict with the 
responsibilities of the auditor. Activities that are generally considered 
management responsibilities include consummating transactions, having 
custody of assets, and otherwise exercising authority on behalf of the 
company. With respect to appraisals and valuations, activities that might 
be considered responsibilities of management include the pricing of a 
company’s product, or determining the sales price of a subsidiary or other 
asset.
3 The terms “prospective financial information,” “projections,” and “forecasts” have specific meanings in 
the auditing literature. They are used informally, however, in this paper, and as synonyms.
10. The auditor is permitted, however, to provide appraisal and valuation 
services in certain circumstances. For example, auditors have historically been 
permitted to assist the client in allocating the purchase price of an acquired 
business to its individual assets and liabilities, in a purchase business 
combination, which often results in the auditor performing some valuation 
work. Some have suggested that this exception to the general rule was based 
on:
a. the fixed total to be allocated to individual assets and liabilities (the 
actual purchase price of the acquired business);
b. the “brick and mortar” or relatively straightforward nature of assets 
and liabilities in the past. Typically, companies have not had the level of 
intangible assets or complex financial instruments, for example, that are 
common today; and
c. the typically long life over which the appraised assets (e.g., property, 
plant, and equipment) were amortized, making the annual impact of any 
incorrect amounts less likely to be significant.
11. Other auditor allocations of fixed amounts have been prohibited, even if 
they do not have direct financial statement consequences. For example, the 
auditor cannot allocate the market value of a company, represented by the 
value of its publicly-traded stock, among the company’s three divisions. 
Presumably, the theory behind the prohibition is that cash flow or other 
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projections would be prepared to support the value of each division, and these 
projections, for example, may impact an asset impairment evaluation, or the 
auditor’s assessment of whether debt covenant violations are on the horizon. 
The auditor may be biased towards forecasts he or she prepared or assisted in 
preparing, when an objective analysis of these projections would reveal that 
they required substantial revisions. Some also believe such valuations involve 
more judgmental matters than purchase-price allocations would typically 
involve.
12. Historically, the SEC Staff has not objected to auditor-provided appraisals 
for estate tax purposes. In some cases, however, the results of these appraisals 
can have financial statement consequences. Auditors have also been permitted 
to value employee benefit plan liabilities for audit clients, possibly because 
generally accepted accounting principles require the amortization of any 
changes in the valuation from year to year, thus reducing the impact of the 
changes on annual earnings.
AICPA Rules Applicable to All Auditors
13. In performing appraisals, all auditors must comply with the independence 
requirements of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
(auditors of public companies must also comply with SEC rules where these are 
more restrictive). AICPA rules currently permit auditor performance of 
appraisal or valuation services, the results of which may be incorporated in the 
audit client’s financial statements, if all of the significant matters of judgment 
involved are determined or approved by the client, and the client is in a position 
to have an informed judgment on the results of those services.  In addition, 
under Statement of Auditing Standards No. 73, Using the Work of a Specialist 
(SAS 73), the auditor has certain responsibilities when relying on the work of a 
specialist, including an appraisal or valuation expert on the audit firm’s staff. 
When relying on a specialist, SAS 73 requires the auditor to assess the:
4
4 AICPA Professional Standards: Code of Professional Conduct, Interpretation 101-3 Under Rule of 
Conduct 101: Performance of Other Services.
a. professional qualifications of the specialist;
b. objectives and scope of the specialist’s work;
c. relationship between the specialist and the client (i.e., the specialist’s 
objectivity);
d. methods or assumptions used;
e. methods or assumptions used compared to those used in the preceding 
period;
f. appropriateness of using the specialist’s work for the intended purpose; 
and
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g. the form and content of the specialist’s findings - information provided 
must allow the auditor to obtain an understanding of the methods and 
assumptions used, make appropriate tests of the data used by the 
specialist, and evaluate whether the findings support the related 
assertions in the financial statements.
14. SAS 73 does not apply to situations where firm specialists directly assist 
the audit team in performing the audit.
SEC Practice Section Rules5
5 SEC Practice Section Reference Manual, SECPS §1000.35. The SEC Practice Section membership 
consists of most firms that audit public companies. Members of the Practice Section must comply with its 
rules and regulations.
6 The Appraisal Institute is a professional organization for commercial and residential real estate appraisers 
with 19,000 members. The Institute offers professional designation programs, and members must adhere to 
its Code of Professional Ethics.
7 The Appraisal Standards Board is part of The Appraisal Foundation. The Board’s Uniform Standards of 
Professional Appraisal Practice are recognized throughout the U.S. as the generally accepted standards of 
professional practice for real estate, personal property, and business appraisal. Over eighty organizations, 
corporations, and government agencies are affiliated with The Appraisal Foundation, as Sponsoring 
Organizations or Advisory Council members.
15. The AICPA’s SEC Practice Section also has membership rules for audit 
firms, including ones governing provision of actuarial services to insurance 
company audit clients. Because the actuarial function is basic to the operation 
and management of an insurance company, the Practice Section rules conclude 
that the CPA firm cannot assume responsibility for this function without 
jeopardizing its independence. Therefore, the CPA firm cannot provide actuarial 
advisory services to an audit client involving the determination of policy 
reserves. Rather, the client must have its own actuaries (internal or external) 
that provide primary actuarial capabilities.
Standards Governing Appraisers and Valuation Experts
16. Appraisers themselves have ethical codes and professional standards, 
which recognize the responsibilities and obligations that these professionals 
have to the public and their profession, beyond those due to their clients. For 
example, the Appraisal Institute’s  Code of Professional Ethics states that6
“.... [because] proper appraisal, consulting, and review gives stability to real
estate loans and investments and this in turn helps to promote public 
confidence in the economy that sustains a free society....ethical responsibilities
and obligations are due to both the public and the profession.” The ethics 
provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, issued by 
the Appraisal Standards Board,7 states that the appraiser “must perform 
assignments with impartiality, objectivity, and independence and without 
accommodation of personal interests....it is unethical for an appraiser to use or
communicate a misleading or fraudulent report or to knowingly permit an 
employee or other person to communicate a misleading or fraudulent report.” 
The Principles of Appraisal Practice and Code of Ethics of the American Society of 
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Appraisers8 recognizes the appraiser’s fiduciary relationship to third parties, 
stating that “[m]embers of the Society recognize their responsibility to those 
third parties, other than the client, who may be specifically entitled to make use 
of their reports.”
8 The American Society of Appraisers is a professional organization representing all disciplines of appraisal 
practice. Each accredited member of the Society must possess a professional designation in one or more 
specialized areas of appraisal, pass written technical and ethics examinations, and submit appraisal reports 
for peer review.
17. The ethical standards governing the appraiser do not permit association 
with a report that the appraiser believes is misleading, even if the report clearly 
states that the client, rather than the appraiser, takes responsibility for the 
assumptions and judgments inherent in the work. Therefore, to comply with 
both the appraisal standards and AICPA rules governing auditors, an appraiser 
(whether or not associated with the audit firm) and the firm’s audit client must, 
in effect, agree on the assumptions and judgments inherent in the appraisal. 
The AICPA’s requirement for appraisals performed for an audit client - that “all 
of the significant matters of judgment involved are determined or approved by 
the client” - does not diminish the appraiser’s obligation to stand behind his or 
her work and the assumptions inherent in that work, even though the audit 
client also takes responsibility for these assumptions and judgments.
Threats to Independence
Self-Review
18. Some believe that the “second look” - the review of the financial statement 
amounts by a second, impartial party - is fundamental to auditing. They 
believe that auditors may lack the requisite skepticism when reviewing their 
own work or the work of colleagues in their firms. Or worse yet, the auditor 
may be reluctant to challenge the work of a colleague, or to disclose and insist 
upon correction of a colleague’s error. The notion that the auditor should
not be placed in the position of auditing his or her own work (or the work of a 
colleague) centers on these concerns related to “self-review.”
19. Others argue that auditors successfully contend with the requirement to 
review and get comfortable with the work of many specialists or consultants in 
their firm. For example, the audit partner reviews the work of firm specialists 
performing tax work such as preparation of tax returns for a client. 
Presumably these auditors are occasionally faced with the responsibility of 
pointing out and correcting errors made by their colleagues. Or, the audit team 
may find itself auditing books and records produced by a computer system that 
its consultants assisted the client in installing. In addition, in performing an 
audit, auditors sometimes discover misstatements in prior year financial 
statements upon which they previously reported, necessitating restatements 
and discussion in the auditors’ report. This group believes that auditors face 
these conflicts periodically, and that there is no widespread evidence that 
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auditors have failed to thoroughly review the work of colleagues, or that they 
have hidden their own or their colleagues’ mistakes.
20. Proponents of firm provision of these services to audit clients would argue 
that current rules (SAS 73) require the audit team to carefully review the work 
of a firm appraiser engaged by the client. Required audit procedures are the 
same whether the appraiser is a firm specialist or a third party. In addition, 
other audit rules, such as those governing second partner reviews, and the way 
in which firms structure audit engagements often result in several firm auditors 
reviewing the same reports and support for account balances provided as audit 
evidence. In many cases, depending on audit risk and materiality, there are 
separate reviews by the senior accountant, manager, partner, and second 
partner. This group believes that these multiple reviews effectively dispel worry 
over losing the “second look” provided by the audit.
Mutuality of Interests and Acting in the Capacity of Management
21. Some argue that valuations of non-financial statement items performed by 
the auditor also threaten the auditor’s independence. Because appraisal 
methodology often involves projections of future cash flows and results, they 
believe that the auditor developing such forecasts may later fail to question 
them or assess them with the requisite skepticism, when they are subsequently 
used to support the reported value of an asset or liability on the financial 
statements. The auditor and the client will have a “mutual interest” in 
rationalizing such a forecast. In addition, this group asserts that the decisions 
made by the valuation specialist are “management decisions” that should not 
be made by the auditor.
22. Others believe that projections and forecasts are recognized by auditors, 
appraisal professionals, companies, and users of financial statements as 
estimates, and that changing circumstances or unforeseen events do not mean 
that the original projections or valuations were inappropriate when issued. 
This group argues that the auditor would not feel compelled to accept stale 
projections originally developed by a firm appraisal specialist when these 
projections showed outcomes that were no longer likely of realization. They 
contend, for example, that auditors routinely argue for increases (or decreases) 
in loss reserves, even when firm specialists and the audit team “signed-off” on 
such reserves in the prior year. In addition, current rules permit the auditor to 
report on prospective financial information,  a practice which some argue would 
pose the same risk of the auditor becoming committed to a set of projections. 
Yet performance of these services has not been identified as the cause of 
subsequent auditor independence problems.
9
9 Current independence rules allow the auditor to report on, but not prepare, prospective financial 
information that may be used by third parties in accordance with certain guidelines.
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23. Some believe that third-party appraisers - those not connected to either 
the client or the audit firm - may have more of a bias in favor of the client’s 
interests (a mutuality of interests) when performing an appraisal. While 
appraisal professionals have an ethical code of conduct and standards requiring 
that they perform their work impartially and in an unbiased manner, some 
argue that it is very difficult not to have some bias in favor of the interests of a 
paying customer. The fact that an appraiser works for the firm that performs 
the audit of the client’s financial statements may provide an added incentive to 
perform the work objectively.
24. On the other hand, if fees have an adverse effect on objectivity, some 
believe that effect is compounded when the client is also paying an annual 
audit fee. The third-party appraiser may have more infrequent engagements 
with the client, which some believe would lessen the desire to compromise 
objectivity to please the client. Countering that is the argument that the size of 
the total fees should be compared to the firm’s total revenue, if there is a 
concern that fees can adversely influence objectivity.
Possible Criteria for Standard-Setting
Materiality and Efficiency
25. Some contend that valuations of immaterial assets or liabilities by 
specialists in the audit firm do not impair auditor independence. They may 
acknowledge the threats to auditor independence that some suggest are posed 
by firm provision of these services - the threat of self-review and a mutuality of 
interest with the client. They believe, however, that services should not be 
proscribed unless they threaten audit quality, and ask how these threats could 
impact audit quality when the amounts being appraised or valued are 
immaterial to the financial statements. Consequently, they believe that the 
rules should only prohibit firm provision of appraisal and valuation services to 
an audit client when the amounts involved could have a material impact on the 
client’s financial statements.
26. Others suggest that materiality is difficult to define, especially when the 
result of the service itself is an estimate of value. They ask why the rules 
should allow immaterial valuations for audit clients, when others parties 
uninvolved in the audit can provide them just as competitively. The audit firm 
has only a minimal efficiency advantage in performing these services, they 
believe, and the relatively small fees that could be earned from valuing 
immaterial items would be offset by the cost of additional safeguards imposed 
to protect auditor independence. This group believes that an audit firm 
appraiser would not have any special knowledge of the client’s affairs that 
would enable a more efficient or effective appraisal project.
27. Others contend that if there is no significant threat to independence, the 
marketplace should determine whether the auditor has an efficiency advantage. 
They argue that the client may be comfortable with the quality of its audit firm 
and the professionalism of its specialists, and may not have the time to 
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research the reputation and qualifications of other specialists. Audit firm 
personnel, who may have a rapport with client management, may be able to 
quickly locate the right specialists within the firm to satisfy the client’s 
valuation requirements. In addition, if the auditor uses the work of a firm 
specialist, engaged by the client to appraise certain assets or liabilities, then 
compliance with the requirements of SAS 73 is easier and more efficient. For 
example, the auditor would not have to assess the qualifications and reputation 
of the specialist, as this would already have been done on a firm-wide level.
28. Contributing more to efficiency, and more importantly, to audit quality, 
this group argues, would be the auditor’s good rapport with a firm specialist. 
They believe that a firm specialist would be more inclined than a third party to 
quickly respond to the auditor’s request for the data and assumptions used in 
the valuation (so that the auditor could test them), and to explain the scope, 
purpose, and results of the work performed. More significantly, a third party 
appraiser, some believe, may have a certain reluctance to be completely open, 
frank, and thorough in his or her conversations with the client’s auditor - a 
reticence that most would not expect from a specialist connected with the audit 
firm.
29. Supporters also believe that a service should not be proscribed unless its 
provision poses a significant risk to auditor independence. They do not believe 
that the auditor’s independence is impaired when a firm specialist values 
immaterial items.
30. Somewhat related to the “efficiency” argument is the belief of some that 
strong valuation expertise resident in the audit firm contributes to audit 
quality. This group believes that auditors today need the expertise of a variety 
of specialists to perform an effective audit. Having that expertise within the 
firm contributes to efficiency. They believe that the ability to provide a wide 
variety of professional opportunities to such experts is important in attracting 
and retaining the best talent. They believe that unnecessary restrictions on the 
work that firm specialists can perform for audit clients hinders the firms’ ability 
to retain high caliber professionals.
31. Others disagree with this argument, pointing out that restrictions on 
services that can be provided by firms to audit clients do not impair the firms’ 
ability to provide professional opportunities to firm specialists. Theoretically, 
the pool of work available to specialists working for audit firms is not reduced 
just because firms cannot provide certain services to audit clients, they 
contend.
Level of Judgment Required
32. Another way to approach standards for auditor provision of appraisal and 
valuation services may be to allow those where:
a. the methodology used is well-established and there are few, if any, 
choices among alternative methodologies; and
10
b. the required assumptions are more routine, based on published 
statistics, or less subjective.
33. For example, an accepted methodology for valuing stock options is the 
Black-Scholes model - a model that is well-established and not subject to a 
great deal of variation. While specialists using the model may not have 
identical results, some believe differences in value are not likely to be material. 
They contend that the information about the options that must be provided is 
both objective and subjective. Assumptions such as volatility and expected 
dividend yield are largely based on trading history, however, and the expected 
option life, an estimate, is based on some factual data, such as the option’s 
term, vesting period, past history for similar grants, and stock volatility. Thus, 
they assert, the model produces consistent results in the hands of different 
specialists. They argue that the independence rules should allow the auditor to 
perform these routine valuations for audit clients, even if appraisals requiring a 
higher degree of judgment are prohibited. The lack of judgment involved in 
some valuations, they believe, mitigates the threat that the auditor is assuming 
management functions.
34. Others may agree with the rationale behind such a distinction in the 
independence rules - a distinction based on the level of judgment involved in 
the valuation - but ask whether rules like these would be operational. It may 
be difficult to assess the level of judgment involved in some valuations prior to 
accepting the engagement, and diversity in practice might result if the 
assessment were left up to the individual professional or firm. Alternatively, 
rules could incorporate a list of common services that are permitted versus 
those that are prohibited; some believe, however, that such detail in an 
independence standard is undesirable, and does not provide guidance to 
professionals on new engagements or those not covered by the rule.
Level of Comfort Requested from the Appraisal / Valuation Specialist
35. Some believe that the independence rules regarding auditor provision of 
appraisal and valuation services should make distinctions based on the level of 
comfort expected from the audit firm valuation specialist. For example, in some 
European countries, a company’s auditors may be asked to report on assets 
contributed to the company in exchange for company stock (“contribution-in- 
kind” reports).  These reports describe the non-cash consideration contributed 
and the methods used (by third parties) to value the assets, and state whether 
the value of the contributed assets is at least equal to the value of the shares 
issued in exchange.
10
10 Some countries (Sweden, Belgium, and Italy) currently require that the company’s auditor furnish the 
contribution-in-kind report, creating a problem for auditors of SEC registrants in these countries in 
complying with both SEC and local rules. The SEC Staff has objected to audit firm issuance of these 
reports for audit clients, stating that the firms would not confirm that their reports do not express an opinion 
on the fairness of the transaction, the value of the security, or the adequacy of consideration to 
shareholders.
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36. Current rules prohibit the auditor from issuing “fairness opinions” for 
audit clients - an opinion, for example, on the fairness of the proposed 
purchase or sale price of an asset or business, or of an exchange ratio in a 
business combination. The SEC Staff has also objected to auditor issuance of 
these contribution-in-kind reports, as the Staff believes that they are akin to 
fairness opinions. Others argue that these reports are fundamentally different 
from fairness opinions, in that the auditor reviews the valuations prepared by 
others in issuing a contribution-in-kind report, and the report issued clearly 
notes this reliance. In contrast, in issuing a fairness opinion, the specialist 
performs the underlying valuation work. Proponents of auditor provision of 
these services analogize to the rules governing prospective financial 
information; the auditor cannot prepare this information for an audit client, but 
is permitted to examine and report on projections and forecasts prepared by 
others. They assert that the independence rules governing appraisal and 
valuation work should make distinctions based on the level of responsibility 
assumed by the auditor. Independence standards, they believe, should permit 
valuation engagements that are more akin to a review of another’s work, as this 
is a natural counterpart to the audit function.
Disclosure of Assumptions in the Financial Statements
37. In setting standards, others would allow routine valuations, such as those 
performed for pension and other post-employment benefit liabilities, where 
disclosure in the financial statements is required of the assumptions used. The 
reasoning behind this proposed exception is that the appraiser may be more 
likely to maintain objectivity knowing that the significant assumptions inherent 
in his or her work would be publicly disclosed in detail in the financial 
statements.
38. Others might argue that financial statement users should not have to 
assess the reasonableness of the assumptions inherent in a valuation expert’s 
work. This, they believe, is the job of the auditor. They contend that disclosure 
of such assumptions does not mitigate the potential for diminished auditor 
objectivity resulting from the fact that the auditor’s colleagues performed the 
underlying work. Just as some believe that disclosure is no cure for bad 
accounting, they would argue that disclosure is no cure for impaired 
independence.
Financial Statement Impact
39. Some may believe that the threats to auditor independence posed by self­
review are sufficient to warrant prohibitions against auditors appraising 
financial statement items. They may not believe, however, that the “mutuality 
of interests” threat is compelling, and accordingly, would allow audit firms to 
value non-financial statement items for audit clients. Therefore, they would 
permit the auditor, for example, to allocate the market capitalization of an audit 
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client to its separate divisions, but would prohibit a derivatives expert from the 
audit firm from valuing that client’s derivatives portfolio.
40. Or, standards could distinguish between valuation work that might have a 
direct impact on the financial statements of an audit client, versus work that 
may only have an indirect effect. Rules might be structured to permit the audit 
firm to perform appraisals for tax purposes, which have indirect financial 
statement consequences, and to value the collateral supporting a loan, even 
though such an appraisal may result in an indication of loan impairment. On 
the other hand, such rules would prohibit the auditor from determining the 
amount that the audit client should record to reflect its environmental 
liabilities.
41. Others might argue that some valuation work, regardless of financial 
statement impact, places audit firm professionals too much in the role of 
management. They would ask whether investors would feel comfortable 
knowing that audit firm professionals advised the audit client on the price to 
pay for a business, or on how much to charge for their products. They believe 
that the auditor requires a certain perspective and distance from the client to 
perform effectively, and that provision of these services inappropriately “blurs 
the line” between the auditor and management.
Potential Safeguards
Additional Reviews
42. Some believe that appraisal specialists in audit firms can effectively 
perform appraisals and valuations for audit clients without impinging on audit 
quality only if certain safeguards to protect auditor independence and 
objectivity are employed. For example, SEC Practice Section standards 
currently require review of the audit engagement by a second partner (the 
concurring reviewer). This second review is not meant to duplicate the work 
done by the engagement partner and other senior audit personnel in its 
entirety. Instead, the second review is focused on the riskier aspects of the 
audit - on those areas where there is a great degree of judgment required on the 
part of the auditor. If audit firms were allowed to perform appraisals for audit 
clients, then the second review could also focus on the appraisal project and its 
impact on the audit as a result of any potential threats to auditor 
independence. Standards could require the reviewer to make specific inquiries 
regarding audit client sophistication and management’s ability to evaluate 
assumptions and results. These rules could also require the reviewer to 
ascertain whether the audit team evaluated the appraisal with appropriate 
skepticism, and whether the team complied with the requirements of SAS 73.
43. In addition, the concurring review could assess the audit team’s overall 
program of safeguards with respect to firm valuation work, and compliance with 
requirements could be tested in peer review (review of the firm’s quality control 
procedures by an outside firm - a requirement for AICPA SEC Practice Section 
members) and in internal inspections conducted within the firm.
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44. Others suggest that a similar concurring review requirement could be 
imposed on the appraisal or valuation work performed by the valuation 
specialists in the audit firm. They believe formal policies should be established 
requiring review of all firm valuation work by a second firm appraiser. Although 
the audit team may still be subject to the threats to independence identified in 
this discussion memo, ultimately, financial reporting problems are more likely 
when the original valuation work is somehow flawed (and less likely when the 
work is done right). Using similar reasoning - that quality work mitigates the 
threats to accurate financial reporting posed by audit firm provision of non­
audit services, including appraisals and valuations - and in response to self­
review concerns, they would suggest requirements to have a third party, for 
example, check software programs used by the firm to perform this work. Some 
believe that this safeguard could be combined with others to adequately protect 
the independence of the audit team when firm specialists perform appraisal and 
valuation services.
Discussion of Services Performed with the Audit Committee
45. The Independence Standards Board’s Standard No. 1, Independence 
Discussions with Audit Committees, requires the auditor to disclose in writing 
and discuss with the audit committee of the client all relationships between the 
auditor and the company that may reasonably be thought to bear on 
independence. If auditor provision of appraisal and valuation services were 
permitted, some believe the requirement to discuss these services with a 
company’s audit committee would help protect auditor independence. 
Knowledge that the services provided will be discussed with the audit 
committee, as surrogates for shareholders, may bring additional focus to 
potential independence threats, and ensure that appropriate safeguards are in 
place to preserve the independence of the audit team.
Audit of a Subsidiary by Another Firm
46. Another suggested safeguard is to require another accounting firm to 
perform the audit of any subsidiaries for which the primary auditor performed 
valuation work. The primary auditor would rely on the audit of the subsidiary 
performed by the other firm - a firm that would not be subject to the 
independence threats posed by the performance of appraisal and valuation 
services. Even if the second auditor is in the position of using the primary 
auditor’s appraisal or valuation report as audit evidence, this group argues, the 
second auditor wouldn’t have any reason to view the report with less skepticism 
than a report from a third party. Others believe that the rules should combine 
this safeguard with the ability to assess the materiality of the valuation services 
provided by the auditor. They do not see why a separate audit should be 
required (with the degree of precision associated with an audit of an individual 
company versus the precision required when the company is part of a 
consolidated group) if the subsidiary itself is immaterial to the consolidated 
financial statements, or if the valuation work performed by the auditor is 
inconsequential.
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Firewalls
47. Finally, some believe that firewalls could effectively separate the audit 
team from the appraisal and valuation specialists in the audit firm. If these 
groups were located in separate divisions, each with a separate group of 
supervisors, they argue that some of the concerns would be mitigated related to 
self-review and the development of an inappropriate mutuality of interests 
between the audit team and the client. Existing audit rules require the auditor 
to communicate with firm personnel responsible for non-audit services if such 
services might result in information that has audit implications.  This group 
contends, however, that firms could be structured so that the audit team’s 
motivation to question less skeptically the work performed by others within the 
firm would be minimized. In addition, if the auditor did not identify strongly 
with the firm appraisal specialists because of structural separation within the 
firm, the risk of the auditor developing a mutuality of interests with the client 
because of jointly-developed projections would diminish. Others disagree with 
this contention, arguing that the auditor’s objectivity could be influenced by the 
knowledge that the appraisal or valuation was prepared by a professional within 
his or her firm, even if the audit and appraisal groups were structurally distinct 
and isolated.
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11 AICPA Professional Standards, AU Section 311.04(b), Planning and Supervision.
Questions for Respondents
Q1. Has the DM identified all the threats to auditor independence posed by 
auditor provision of appraisal and valuation services? If not, please describe 
the additional threats and whether they should result in any proscriptions of 
services by auditors.
Q2. Should standards governing auditor provision of these services make 
distinctions based on the materiality of the appraised items? If so, how would 
you judge materiality?
Q3. Are there benefits that may exceed the costs - the potential threats to 
independence - of allowing audit firms to provide these services to audit clients? 
If so, what are these benefits?
Q4. Do you believe that the methodology used in some appraisals is more 
established and subject to fewer alternatives than in others? Are the required 
assumptions in some appraisals more routine, based on published statistics, or 
otherwise less subjective than in others? If you believe that these differences 
exist, should auditor independence standards make distinctions based on these 
differences? If so, please provide some examples of services that should be 
permitted as well as those that should be prohibited.
Q5. Should auditor independence standards governing these services 
distinguish between engagements where the valuation specialist is performing 
the underlying valuation work versus those in which he or she reviews and 
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relies upon the work of third parties (e.g., European contribution-in-kind 
reports)?
Q6. Do you believe that standards should allow firm specialists to value 
financial statement amounts for firm audit clients when the assumptions 
inherent in the valuation work are fully disclosed in the financial statements?
Q7. Should auditor independence standards governing these services 
distinguish between appraisals and valuations that have a direct financial 
statement impact versus those that have no financial statement consequences, 
or only indirect consequences? If so, how would these standards operate?
Q8. Are there other distinctions that these standards should contemplate?
Q9. Do you believe that the safeguards outlined in the DM could effectively 
protect auditor independence when the audit firm provides appraisal and 
valuation services to an audit client? Are there other safeguards that would be 
effective?
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